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Over the past few years, I have been researching the failed peace process 
between Israel and the PLO, from Oslo 1993 until the present. I have 
examined how the conditions of peace were advanced and promoted via third-
party mediation. This research is important, as the Americans continue to fail 
in their mediation attempts. Indeed, the Oslo channel was opened at a time 
when formal, non-secretive negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians 
were stalled in Washington DC. To date, despite considerable political, 
economic and diplomatic investments in the peace process, the United States 
has been unable to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to sign a 
comprehensive peace pact and to settle their bloody conflict. While some 
progress has been made, peace is still a distant prospect. 
The goal of the Kurtzer interview is to unearth the historical processes 
constituting the peace process from an American perspective. Evidence from 
people who were part of the process can help identify the factors that move 
history forward. The interviews I conducted with Kurtzer and some thirty other 
people reveal that there is not one history, but many histories. People who 
were in the same room perceive the same situation in different ways. A classic 
Rashomon. 
 The Kurtzer interview begins with Oslo 1993. The Intifada, which 
erupted in 1987, constituted a threat to Arafat’s leadership.3 He was surprised 
                                                 
1 This interview is taken from my book, From Oslo to Jerusalem: A Critical Study of Peace 
Mediation, Facilitation and Negotiations between Israel and the PLO (Cambridge, 
forthcoming). 
2 I thank Tzippy Hauser for her constructive comments and kind assistance. 
3 Mary Elizabeth King, A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent 
Resistance (New York, 2007); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “The Intifada: Causes, 
Consequences, and Future Trends”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2(1) (1991): 12-40.  
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by the scale of the uprising, which brought thousands of protesters to the 
streets to fight against the Israeli occupation. The rise of Hamas further 
threatened his position in Gaza and the West Bank. Arafat was anxious to do 
something which would bring him to the center of attention. Moreover, his 
alliance with the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War 
undermined his position in the moderate Arab world. Arafat needed to 
reinforce his leadership among the Palestinian people. 
 Arafat was also well aware of the warming relationship between Israel 
and Jordan.4 He understood that King Hussein was interested in signing a 
peace treaty with Israel. Egypt had signed a peace treaty with Israel without 
the Palestinians, and Arafat had no illusions that Hussein would insist on 
waiting for him, or would coordinate steps leading to peace with him. He 
thought another peace pact between Israel and an Arab country would further 
isolate him.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s, as a result of 
the Cold War, the arms race, technological deficiency, the rise of the Soviet 
national republics, and the inner power struggle in Moscow, left the 
international arena with only one powerful actor, the United States, which 
squarely aligned itself with Israel.5 Arafat could no longer count on the Soviet 
Union to serve as a counterbalance against American interests. He 
understood the need to create new opportunities for himself, inter alia, by 
establishing ties with the West and, especially, the United States. 
The return of Israel’s Labour Party to power in the summer of 1992 
signalled a moment of change. In his second term as prime minister, the more 
experienced Yitzhak Rabin wished to move away from containment to signing 
peace treaties with Israel’s neighbours, first and foremost Syria. He was also 
prepared to address the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the occupation. 
His foreign minister, Shimon Peres, explained that “We were not going to rule 
the Palestinians against their will. We were always looking for a way to 
liberate them from our occupation and to liberate ourselves as occupiers”.6 
 At the time, negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) were illegal for Israelis, as it was deemed a terrorist organization. The 
Israeli government refused to officially negotiate with Arafat, although it was 
clear that he was still the person most capable of striking a deal, and the only 
true representative of the Palestinian people. Bilateral negotiations had begun 
in Washington between Israel and Palestinians who were supposedly 
independent of the PLO, although everyone knew they were not. As 
mentioned above, these talks led nowhere.7  
In his 29-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service, Daniel Kurtzer served 
as the United States Ambassador to Israel (2001-2005) and to Egypt (1997-
2001). Kurtzer is presently the S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East 
Policy Studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs, Princeton University, and he has published important books about the 
                                                 
4 Shabtai Shavit, Head of Mossad (Rishon LeZion, 2018), 167-190 [Hebrew]. Interview with 
Shavit (July 2, 2018). 
5 David R. Marples, The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991 (London, 2004). 
6  Shimon Peres and Robert Littell, For the Future of Israel (Baltimore, 1998): 83. 
7 Ibid., 84.  
 
 3 
peace process. For the purpose of my own book, Kurtzer granted me a long 
interview. Here, I bring his thoughts about Oslo, Camp David, Taba, the Arab 
peace initiative, and Hamas.  
 
Interview with Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer: 
April 6, 2017 
Princeton, N.J.  
 
Cohen-Almagor: When did you hear the word “Oslo”, and “Oslo Accords” for 
the first time?  
  
Kurtzer: I was actually the first American official to be aware that 
anything was brewing. It was the summer of 1992, when the 
then-Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway, Jan Egeland, came 
to Washington for a visit. I was invited to lunch at the home of 
the Norwegian Ambassador, and when the lunch finished, Mr. 
Egeland and the Ambassador asked if I would stay behind. I 
did, and they said, “How would the American administration 
react if we, the Norwegians, tried to develop some kind of a 
dialogue between Israel and the PLO?” My response was to 
say three things. Number one, if you want an official American 
government viewpoint, I’ll take the question back to the State 
Department, and work it through the system to get an answer 
for you. Number two, if you want my personal view, there’s no 
reason for you to ask us. You’re an independent country, and 
if Israel and the PLO want to start a dialogue that’s fine.  But I 
would hope that you would keep us deeply informed of what 
you do, so that we, as the shepherd of the Madrid peace 
process,8 would not be caught unawares of what you were 
doing. And number three, I said, if you go ahead and do it, just 
a piece of advice. They had mentioned to me that this was a 
Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin, Avi Gil9 initiative. I said, don’t do it 
unless you have Rabin on board. Because we’ve had 
experience, for example, the London Accord, back in 1987, 
where Peres tried something, but he did it behind the back of 
the sitting prime minister.10 You don’t want that to happen 
here. So, if you go ahead and do it, you’ve got to make sure 
that there is a unified view within the Israeli government.  
                                                 
8 The Madrid Peace Conference, held from October 30 to November 1, 1991, was the first 
time that Israeli leaders negotiated face to face with delegations from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, 
as well as with the Palestinians. 
9 See Avi Gil, The Peres Formula (Modi’ín, 2018) [Hebrew]. 
10 The London Agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and Foreign Affairs Minister 
Shimon Peres was signed during a secret meeting held at the residence of Lord Mishcon in 




Cohen-Almagor: So, it’s July ’92? Around that time? 
  
Kurtzer: Probably August, because it was after the Israeli election. The 
election was in June. I can’t remember when Rabin actually 
formed the government. It was after the government was 
formed.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: And then you continued to hear about it? 
  
Kurtzer: I didn’t hear anything for a few months, until December. 
During that period, the Knesset changed the law with regard 
to Israeli contact with the PLO.  They changed the law, and 
decriminalized contact with the PLO. Around that time, I heard 
from Yair Hirschfeld, whom I had met when I was stationed in 
Israel in the 1980s. We had become friends.  He called me 
and said that he was coming to London in January, on the 
margins of one of the multilateral negotiations that we were 
shepherding at the time. I was the U.S. official largely 
responsible for the multilaterals, so I was going to be in 
London. He said to me that they’re going to have the first 
meeting in London with PLO representatives, organized by the 
Norwegians. After the meeting he briefed me.  
  
  
Cohen-Almagor: He met Abu Ala11 and then he briefed you?  
  
Kurtzer: Right, exactly. After the initial contact with Egeland, and after 
this meeting and all of the subsequent meetings that I was 
briefed on, I would send a note “outside the system”. In other 
words, it was a note with restricted readership that would go to 
the Secretary of State and the peace team. The briefings I 
received were all memorialized. The reason I mention this is 
going to become important later. Nothing about Oslo should 
have been a surprise later, as some people thought it was.  
After their February meeting, which took place in Oslo, 
Hirschfeld called and shared with me the first draft of the 
Declaration of Principles12 that had been discussed, and I 
shared with him some of my own comments. This was not a 
cleared piece of paper on our side, but my own views. We 
were also discussing a declaration of principles in the formal 
negotiations in Washington, so this was all kind of coming 
together, or merging in some way. I don’t think he was happy 
                                                 
11 Ahmed Qurei, known as Abu Ala, was born in the Abu Dis area in 1937. Qurei joined the 
PLO in the late 1960s and was an early member of Fatah. In 1989, he was elected to the 
Fatah Central Committee, specializing in economic affairs. 





with my comments. If you read his book,13 he thought I was 
too tough on what they were doing.  Hirschfeld kept me 
informed after every meeting between January and May.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: In what form? In phone calls or memos? 
  
Kurtzer: Phone calls. At some point along the way, two other things 
happened.  
 
 In addition to Hirschfeld’s briefings, twice Egeland went to the 
American Embassy in Oslo, and called me on the secure line.  
 He gave a fairly detailed briefing of where things were in the 
talks. I wrote that up for the Secretary and the peace team. 
And then, the Foreign Minister of Norway called Secretary 
Christopher14 and briefed him. So, we were being kept pretty 
much informed by both the Israeli side and the Norwegian 
side. Primarily through me, but then we also had direct contact 
between the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the Secretary of 
State.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: Now it’s Christopher.  
  
Kurtzer: It’s Christopher, yes.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Because there were elections.  
  
Kurtzer: Yes. The new administration came in on January 20th of ’93.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: And you stayed in the same position.  
  
Kurtzer: I stayed in the same position, yes.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: And then it all came about in September. 
  
Kurtzer: In mid-May, we were scheduled to have one of our multilateral 
working group meetings on refugees in Norway. I was the 
Chair of that group and was supposed to go, but I could not 
travel to the meeting. Edmund Hull, who was on the National 
Security Council staff,15 and who was part of our peace team 
and, therefore, aware of what was going on, went in my place, 
as the Chair of the delegation. Something happened, as soon 
as he arrived, that made the Norwegians nervous.  I think he 
went up to Egeland or one of the Norwegians, in the hotel 
lobby, and said, “Let’s have a talk about what’s going on in the 
                                                 
13 Yair Hirschfeld, Track-Two Diplomacy toward an Israeli-Palestinian Solution 1978-2014 
(Washington DC, 2014).  
14 Warren Christopher was US Secretary of State between 1993 and 1997. 
15 Edmund J. Hull, http://www.nndb.com/people/660/000122294/ 
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secret channel.” If that’s what happened, it was a mistake for 
two reasons. Number one, you don’t talk about the secret 
channel in a hotel lobby. Number two, the Norwegians didn’t 
know him and, therefore, didn’t know that he was part of the 
team that would have been briefed on the issue. At the same 
time that that was happening,  the transition took place, on the 
Israeli side to government officials -- Uri Savir16 and Joel 
Singer.17 At that point, Peres – for whom there was always a 
bit of distrust of the United States in the peace process –  




So, as we say in our idiom, we “went dark” then, from May 
until the end of July. We didn’t know what was going on. We 
were curious, but it was also a period of extremely intense 
activity in Washington on the Palestinian track.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Because there were the Washington talks. 
  
Kurtzer: We had the Washington talks, and Aaron Miller18 and I were 
deputized to work with the Palestinians and the Israelis. We 
were working on a Declaration of Principles. And we stayed 
“dark” until the end of July, when Christopher traveled to the 
region. When we arrived in Israel on July 31, Yossi Beilin 
asked to meet me late one night, and he spent about two and 
a half hours basically laying out the whole emerging Oslo 
agreement. There were still a few minor things to be done, but 
he gave a briefing that indicated they had done 99%. They 
had not yet finished the language on mutual recognition, 
which was a big issue. Christopher was scheduled to meet 
Rabin very early the next morning. Beilin’s briefing finished 
after midnight, and it made no sense to write a memo 
summarizing the briefing. So, in the early morning pre-brief of 
Christopher I said to him, “Let me just give you a very short 
summary of what happened last night.” When I concluded, he 
asked what he was supposed to do with this information. Our 
group suggested that, in the small meeting with Rabin, he 
should ask Rabin, “This is what we were briefed on. Are you 
ready to say yes?” Well, as it turned out, he didn’t ask that 
question. He asked a different question: “We got a briefing. Do 
you think Arafat’s going to go through with this?” Rabin had a 
very negative view of Arafat, as we know -- had never trusted 
him, even though he understood that Arafat was the ultimate 
Palestinian decision maker. Rabin’s answer to the question 
was analytical. He basically said, “I don’t think Arafat’s going 
                                                 
16 Director-General of the Foreign Ministry (1993-1996). 
17 See R. Cohen-Almagor, “The Oslo Peace Process: Interview with Joel Singer”, Israel 
Affairs (August 24, 2018). 
18 See Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace 
(New York, 2008). 
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to go through with it.” The problem was Rabin was answering 
the wrong question.  The question Christopher should have 
asked was whether Rabin would go through with it. As I 
learned later, it was at this meeting with Rabin that he handed 
to Christopher and Ross the so-called “deposit” or the “pocket” 
on Golan. He gave to Christopher and Ross a diplomatic gift, 
that is, Israel would be ready to meet Assad’s requirements on 
territory, if Assad would be ready to meet Israel’s 
requirements on security and peace.  
 Christopher returned to the hotel after his meetings, told us 
what Rabin had said (in response to the wrong question), and 
he and the rest of the peace team dismissed the Oslo 
channel. Thus, they were surprised when Peres showed up at 
Point Magu in California and said an agreement had been 
reached.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: What do you know about Abu Ala? Because, to the Israelis, as 
far as I can understand, he was almost an unknown entity in 
1992.  
  
Kurtzer: We didn’t know him. He was also an unknown entity to us. We 
had some intelligence community analysis of Palestinian 
finances and economics, and he was, of course, the head of 
the business side of the PLO. So, we knew a little bit about 
what he had been doing, but nobody knew him. 
  
Cohen-Almagor: What are Oslo’s achievements, in hindsight, if you reflect. 
What do you think the main achievements of Oslo were? Was 
it a bad agreement? Was it a viable agreement? Was it a 
mistake? Was it a win? Was it an achievement? What was it?   
  
Kurtzer: The single biggest achievement was to fix the problem of 
Palestinian representation that had hampered us before that 
moment.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: You mean negotiating directly with the PLO.  
  
Kurtzer: The PLO is the body that’s been approved by the Palestinian 
people to represent them. For years, Israel and we had tried 
to circumvent the PLO -- the Village Leagues, or Shamir’s 
election plan, or even the Madrid Peace Conference, with the 
joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.  There were efforts to 
try to get around the PLO, but it had never worked. Rabin 
understood this. He came to Washington in February 1993, for 
his first visit.  
  
Rabin held a meeting with only us, the lower level officials, not 
including Christopher. He engaged in a thought process, that 
he was speaking out loud, where he said, “Arafat’s not 
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acceptable to me. He’s a terrorist. He kills people. I don’t trust 
him at all. But I can’t negotiate with the Palestinian delegation 
in Washington, because (a) they don’t have any authority, and 
(b) they turn to Arafat anyway. And so, how can I get around 
this without talking to Arafat?” He kept coming back to the 
reality of what he had to deal with, but didn’t want to deal with. 
So, even if he didn’t know about Oslo from the very beginning, 
when Peres finally told him about Oslo, he was in a frame of 
mind to understand its importance. And that is the single 
biggest achievement of Oslo. The Oslo Declaration of 
Principles has tremendous weaknesses. It was weaker, much 
weaker, than the DoP that we were negotiating in Washington. 
And Rabin knew that.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Elucidate. Weaker. What does that mean? 
  
Kurtzer: In June of ’93, Aaron Miller and I drafted a compromise text, 
because the two sides had been exchanging language and so 
forth. And there were several issues that made Rabin 
extremely angry in that U.S. draft. One was jurisdiction over 
land. The Palestinians said they would not accept the idea of 
personal autonomy – which had been around since the first 
Camp David. So, the provisional authority had to have 
jurisdiction over land, in their view. Rabin was not ready yet to 
give that up. I can’t remember the formulation, but we had a 
Jerusalem issue in there. The other big issue was legislation, 
legislative authority. The Israeli position, since the autonomy 
talks had started in 1979, was that the Palestinian Authority 
would have the ability to promulgate regulations, but not to 
legislate. Legislation is a manifestation of sovereignty. Our 
draft said they would have the right to legislate. We had some 
caveats in there, so that they couldn’t legislate an independent 
state or declare independence. When Rabin saw our draft – 
by that time, he already had in front of him what was going on 
in Oslo -- he understood that our draft was much, much further 
down the line.  
But that was the weakness of Oslo, that it didn’t have those 
things in it. The Israeli negotiators, later, were to admit, as we 
understood at the time, that the five-year period that was 
supposed to end in May of ’99 had no definition. Oslo didn’t 
say that the outcome of the final status negotiation would be 
an independent state. It just said there should be a final status 
agreement. A breakthrough moment existed in ’93 to 
definitively declare the two-state outcome -- that five years 
after the first implementation agreement in May ‘94, there 
would be a Palestinian state. And that was missing.  
Also missing was any reference to settlements and any 
reference to Jerusalem. You remember, in Oslo, the last-
minute hitch was the requirement that Holst, the Foreign 
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Minister, send a letter that Jerusalem will be handled in final 
status –  it wasn’t in the agreement itself.  
And there was no mention of settlements at all. The Israelis 
have said that the reason settlements weren’t mentioned is 
that Rabin had allowed them to say, as a verbal commitment, 
that he was going to constrain settlement activity, but couldn’t 
take the political step of putting it in writing in the agreement, 
because there would be too much of an uproar. So, it was 
kind of a “trust me” moment. And they conveyed that to the 
Palestinians, and Arafat accepted to trust Rabin on 
settlements. On the one hand, Rabin never authorized 
another formal settlement. But on the other hand, settlements 
grew, both in terms of the unauthorized, illegal outposts and in 
terms of population.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: So, when you saw the agreement, you already had your 
suspicions. You said it’s a good, positive step along the way to 
peace, but it’s far from perfect. You knew that –  
  
Kurtzer: We knew that it was far from perfect, but it was a political 
breakthrough. I guess I should have started with that. I mean, 
it was sensational in that respect. The White House ceremony 
was amazing. And that iconic picture of Clinton presiding over 
the handshake. So, at that point, who’s going to look at the 
text? Only us nerds.   But, politically, it was explosive, as you 
know.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: What do you think the Norwegian role was in this?  
  
Kurtzer: Well, the most positive thing they did was to get this thing off 
the ground. And that meant being sensitive enough to the 
constraints that were much more significant on the Israeli side. 
In the beginning, you had an official on the PLO side 
negotiating with two academics.  I talked to Yair Hirschfeld 
about this, because it was uneven. But the Norwegians were 
sensitive to that. Number two, they were good “caterers”, in 
the sense that they set up the meeting well. They provided 
auspices, they made people feel comfortable. In the 
negotiations, the importance of socializing the two sides to 
each other should not be underestimated. Israel and the 
Palestinians are enemies, but Israelis and Palestinians know 
each other in the West Bank and Israel. Nobody knew the 
PLO. Sometimes, a couple of Israelis would run off and see 
them somewhere, but the PLO was like a locked room, as far 
as anybody was concerned. Nobody knew who they were or 
what they were. And thus the socialization process was quite 
important. I’m not aware that the Norwegians did anything 
more substantive, but I don’t want to underestimate the role 




Cohen-Almagor: So, they were not mediators, they were facilitators.  
  
Kurtzer: They were definitely facilitators, definitely not mediators. Even 
if, once in a while, they may have suggested something. But I 
don’t even think they did that very often.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Do you think that the absence of the United States was an 
advantage or a disadvantage?  
  
Kurtzer: I think, given the timing of when this happened, the absence 
of the United States was an advantage. It was a new 
administration, trying to get its feet on the ground. There was 
a certain amount of suspicion on the part of the new Clinton 
administration that the Bush administration had been too 
tough on Israel. And so, being asked to get involved in a PLO 
thing, I think, would not have helped. It was very wise that the 
Israelis and Norwegians kept us briefed, at least most of the 
time.  
That said, what we also understood all along, until the end, is 
that when he did know about Oslo, Rabin’s conception of Oslo 
was that it would feed into the Washington talks. And it turned 
out that that didn’t happen at all. Oslo became an independent 
initiative.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Do you think that there is a role for small countries to play in 
mediation? Or just facilitation, like what happened in Oslo?  
  
Kurtzer: Norway has had successes and failures. They had a major 
failure in Sri Lanka.19 They took a decision, once they became 
an oil producing giant to use a multibillion dollar fund for the 
future. They took an affirmative decision that they were going 
to become a country that would do mediation. Sometimes it 
works, sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes a conflict can benefit 
from what they offer. And sometimes, as in Sri Lanka, you 
need somebody to come in and knock heads a little bit, which 
the Norwegians don’t have the power to do.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: So, if I understand you correctly, you are saying that they 
have the role as facilitators, but not as mediators.  
  
Kurtzer: I think it gets more challenging to think of them as mediators. 
  
                                                 
19 “Norway in Sri Lanka – The peace initiative that went out the window”, UN Information 
Centre for Western Europe, https://www.unric.org/en/sri-lanka/27121-norway-in-sri-lanka-the-
peace-initiative-that-went-out-the-window   
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Cohen-Almagor: Is it possible to have a deal without the United States?  
  
Kurtzer: Sure.   If Israel and the PLO really want a deal, they don’t 
need the United States. The problem is that they have gotten 
to a point of not being able to figure out how to build a bridge 
between the last positions of the two sides. And that’s the role 
that somebody’s got to play. Is it possible for them to do it 
themselves? Sure. If you look at what Olmert offered in 2008, 
in a strictly bilateral negotiation, Olmert offered almost 
everything, but not everything.20 The question: Had he not 
been indicted, or was not heading towards an indictment, 
would he have understood that to really test the Palestinians 
you have to offer everything? Because what do they have? 
They don’t have anything to offer. They’re going to get 
territory. They’re going to get some number of refugees, even 
if you call them humanitarian family reunification. They’re 
going to get something in Jerusalem, which they’re going to 
call a capital. What do they give, besides a commitment to 
make peace?  
  
Cohen-Almagor: You stop terror. That’s a big deal.  
  
Kurtzer: Yes. it’s a huge deal, but it’s a hard problem for Israel 
because you’re giving very tangible assets in return for a 
commitment. 
 
Cohen-Almagor: Let’s talk about Camp David. Were you there?  
  
Kurtzer: I was not there.  
 I thought that I should have been, but I was ambassador in 
Cairo, and the Egyptians didn’t want to go to Camp David, and 
so the administration didn’t invite the American ambassador to 
Camp David.  
 I went to Cairo in January of ’98, and was there until the 
summer of 2001, when I transferred to Israel as ambassador.   
 The U.S. team at Camp David also didn’t keep us briefed. 
Didn’t keep me and Bill Burns, who was in Jordan,21 briefed 
on what was happening, which meant that we couldn’t keep 
our host governments briefed. Mubarak was fuming angry that 
he was getting phone calls from the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, and I had nothing to say to him. I didn’t know what 
was going on. I called Camp David, tried to get through to 
people. Nobody returned my calls. I think this is one of the 
main faults of American diplomacy. You get into this insular 
thing, where you don’t realize that you can use the Egyptians, 
                                                 
20 Ehud Olmert, In First Person (Tel Aviv, 2018) [Hebrew]. 




or you can use the Jordanians. But if you do that, you have to 
invest some time with them. I did get one call from Dennis 
Ross, in the middle of one night, while he was in Camp David. 
He said to me to go to Mubarak and propose the “upstairs 
downstairs” idea on the Temple Mount, Haram al-Sharif. The 
U.S. had a proposal on the table that Palestinians would enjoy 
sovereignty on the top of the Haram, and Israel would enjoy 
sovereignty below the surface. So, I said to Dennis at the 
time, “Number one, I think it’s a pretty silly idea. And number 
two, are you sure that there is a possibility that either side is 
going to accept this?” He said, “Yes. We’re working it, we’re 
working it.” So, next morning, I called Mubarak. He was in 
Alexandria, and I asked if I could come see him. And he said, 
“No, we’ll just talk on the phone.” I said, “I got this phone call 
from Camp David and this idea, and you know, we’d like your 
support, if you could call Arafat.” And his anger came out, 
because he said, “I’ve heard this already from the 
Palestinians, who think it’s a really bad idea. And I’ve heard 
from the Israelis, who think it’s a bad idea. And now you’re 
telling me, as though this is a brand new idea.” He was really 
angry. And, of course, he was right. We had kept him shut out 
for however many days, eight or nine days at that point.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: So, this is one thing that could have been done differently. To 
involve Mubarak, and maybe the Jordanians, and the Saudis. 
  
Kurtzer: And the Jordanians, and the Saudis. Yes, of course. 
  
Cohen-Almagor: Could anything else have been done differently at Camp 
David?  
  
Kurtzer: Well, a lot of things. If you look at the first Camp David, you 
have two states; they have a structure and a history, and all 
the rest. Which you don’t have at Camp David II. You have a 
state that’s occupying a people, that’s asking that people to 
negotiate its way out of occupation. One of the things that 
marked the first Camp David is that there were already drafts 
of what would emerge as the Camp David Accords circulating 
before Camp David. The U.S. and the Egyptians and the 
Israelis met at Leeds Castle in the United Kingdom,22 and the 
U.S. produced a draft based on those talks. So, Carter made 
the political decision to convene a summit, which is not easy 
to do. But he did it on the basis of there being some raw 
material that had been worked on, and minimum terms of 
reference. In the second Camp David, there was no such 
                                                 
22 Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, “Far from the Madding Crowd — Leeds 






Cohen-Almagor: There’s no paper.  
  
Kurtzer: There’s no paper discussed in advance. There’s no agreed 
concept, even. Arafat didn’t want to go to Camp David.  I got a 
call before Camp David from Washington that asked me to 
see Mubarak and ask him to put pressure on Arafat to come 
to Camp David. So, I go to see Mubarak. We talk about it and 
he says, “All right, I’ll talk to Arafat.” He comes back to me and 
he says, “Arafat said two things in response to the request or 
the demand that he go to Camp David. Number one, why 
should he go to Camp David when there are secret talks 
underway in Stockholm that are not yet ripe? And secondly, 
he’s afraid that there’ll be a U.S. paper that he hasn’t seen, 
and that, as a result, if he doesn’t say yes to it, he’s going to 
get blamed for failure.” So, I report this to Washington. My 
answer to Mubarak from Washington is, “You can tell Arafat 
he’s not going to be surprised by a U.S. paper and he won’t 
get blamed.” As it turned out, we surprised him with a U.S. 
paper and he got blamed.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: So there was a paper during Camp David. After a few days. I 
think, four days, or the fourth day. It’s Miller and Ross –  
  
Kurtzer: Yes. Which Arafat had not seen before.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Which the Israelis corrected. 
  
Kurtzer: Which the Israelis corrected, and the Americans handed over 
the corrected copy. So even if they had retyped that page, 
which should have been the minimum they did, was it the right 
tactic to give Yasser Arafat a paper at that early stage? 
  
Cohen-Almagor: The Israelis and the Palestinians rejected the paper.  
  
Kurtzer: Because, as I understand it, Barak always got cold feet. He 
got to a point at Camp David where he and Arafat stopped 
talking to each other. They didn’t meet after the first day or 
two.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: I don’t think they ever met. Not substantially.  
  
Kurtzer: Well, there was, I guess, one trilateral right at the beginning. 
Remember that picture of Barak pushing Arafat through the 
door?  So, I don’t take anything away from Barak for having 
made some offers at Camp David that were quite forward 
leaning. But the tactical and negotiating mistakes at Camp 
David were extraordinary. And I’m talking primarily about the 
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American side.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Why did the Americans agree to it? If Yasser Arafat tells you, 
we are not ready. And I think one of the American negotiators 
said the time is not ripe. So why did Clinton agree to it? I 
understand Barak pressured him –  
  
Kurtzer: I don’t know if one of the negotiators said it. Maybe yes, 
maybe no. Clinton at this point, was heavily invested in the 
peace process. He spent six years largely uninvolved, and 
then at Wye Plantation he got overly involved. He went from 
zero to a hundred. So, by the time Barak approached him, and 
said, “I want to do a summit to try to either solve this thing or 
unmask Arafat”, Clinton was so heavily involved, invested, 
that it probably made sense to him. He had six months left in 
his administration.  Maybe, he said, if Carter could do it at a 
summit, I can do it at a summit.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: So why didn’t it work out? He was there. He was heavily 
involved. He even attended meetings. Why didn’t it work out? 
  
Kurtzer: Arafat wasn’t ready to reach any agreements at Camp David. I 
think Arafat would have been happy to conclude Camp David 
with an agreement to meet again, but Arafat was not ready to 
reach any substantive agreements. Barak showed up at Camp 
David without a government, basically. It was a minority 
cabinet. Arafat knew Israeli politics as well as we did. So, he’s 
looking at, essentially, a very weak prime minister. He’s 
looking at a president who’s only got six months left. And I 
think he was also scared of his own constituency - refugees, 
in particular, and the Arab world -- on the question of 
Jerusalem. So, I think Arafat did not go to Camp David with an 
intention to reach any agreements. The best that could have 
been gotten out of Arafat was to have a process continue. 
Maybe another summit in September, and then another 
summit in October, and then a closing summit that wraps 
things up before the administration leaves office. He was not 
prepared to reach an agreement.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: So, you say that even if Barak would propose to him what he 
wanted –  
  
Kurtzer: Barak, as I mentioned, went further than any previous prime 
minister on substance. But it wasn’t close to Palestinian 
requirements. If you really want to test the Palestinians, 
you’ve got to offer them 100% of what they want. That’s not 
the way negotiations normally take place. Except, it goes back 
to the issue of negotiating apples and oranges here. The 
Palestinians want 100% of the 22% of the land that’s left for 
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them. They want a capital in Jerusalem. They want the 
powers of an independent state, even if they’re willing to 
derogate some of those powers, such as in security areas. 
And they want something on the refugees. I don’t think they 
will demand the right of return, but they want to say that they 
got the right of return, even if they don’t exercise it.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: How do you know that? 
  
Kurtzer: I was the head of the refugee working group, as early as 
1992. And the refugees came into that group as part of the 
Palestinian delegation, and they all said to us – and I don’t 
want to say that I believe them – “Look, we’re not unrealistic 
people. You’ve got some people sitting with the key to their 
former homes around their necks. They’re sitting in a refugee 
camp in Lebanon. They expect that we will produce their 
house in Akko [Acre] or in Ramla. But most Palestinians have 
no expectations. They want dignity. They want a sense that 
they didn’t lose out in history. That there is a right and wrong 
here.” These are issues that I don’t know how to resolve; the 
refugee issue is challenging, in that respect. And that’s why 
I’m not sure you can get to 100% of what the Palestinians 
need on refugees. You can, on almost every other issue. But 
that’s really the only way to finally test whether the 
Palestinians are really ready to make peace. And I have to tell 
you, I don’t know if their answer would be yes, under those 
circumstances. If Olmert, in 2008, after putting his proposal 
out had come back to Abbas and said, “Okay, look, I know 
what you want. Here it is.” And then laid it all out? I don’t know 
the answer to it. But what I do believe – I can’t say I know it – 
but I believe that you will not ever be able to answer that 
question definitively until you’ve reached that 100% point. So, 
this idea that you can do 97% and 98%, and you can finagle 
and maneuver -- it’s not going to work with a people that has 
had problems of leadership and organization and structure 
and process. Palestinians don’t work that way. It’s not going to 
happen.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: What were the American mistakes at Camp David? Besides 
the one that you already mentioned.  
  
Kurtzer: Lack of any preparation that would have been concretized 
either in a paper or even a conceptual understanding -- kind 
of, where the Americans wanted them to be. We call them 
parameters now. In other words, we tell the parties you can’t 
go to Camp David with one side saying, “I want all of 
Palestine,” And the other side saying “I want all of Eretz 
Yisrael [the Land of Israel].”  Rather, the Americans say, “that 
doesn’t work. We’re talking about the ’67 lines with mutually-
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agreed changes.”  But there were no conceptual 
understandings, let alone a paper.  Number two, my 
understanding is that we didn’t always have the right people 
there on some of the core issues. On Jerusalem, for example,  
 we didn’t have anybody who really understood Jerusalem. 
Each of these issues requires a significant amount of technical 
expertise. The technicians are not going to make the deal, but 
the devil is in the details. So, if you’re a senior official, you 
want to go into the room knowing that the guy right behind you 
knows exactly what the Green Line is, and where the 
neighborhoods are, and how many people are living in various 
settlements or neighborhoods.  You don’t have to know that, 
but you have to know that you can lean back, when those 
issues come up, and get a briefing. And we didn’t have all the 
right people there who knew that stuff. If you have the right 
people on the core issues, and some different or unanticipated 
issue comes up – offshore gas, which nobody was even 
thinking about -- then you can say, “All right, look, we didn’t 
anticipate that offshore gas would come up. I’m going to call 
back to Washington and get our energy experts here.”  
  
Cohen-Almagor:  What’s the relationship between Barak and Albright23?  
  
Kurtzer: You know, I really don’t know, because I wasn’t there.  
 Early on, in Albright’s tenure, I went off to Egypt, so my focus 
was Albright’s relationship with Mubarak and with Amr 
Moussa.24  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Was it correct to put all the blame on Yasser Arafat in the 
end?  
  
Kurtzer: No, of course not. Even if I would agree that he bears the 
lion’s share of responsibility for failure, once you assign 
blame, you’re basically saying the process is over. Or has 
reached a point where it can’t go further. What you want to do 
at the end of a failed Camp David is to put out the idea that 
you’ve narrowed some differences, and there are problems 
that remain, and the two sides are going to go back, and 
they’re going to consult, and we’ll have our team come out for 
further talks. You know, you want a sense of continuity. This 
could have happened.  Right after Camp David, Ned Walker, 
who was then the Assistant Secretary of State, made a trip to 
the region to brief on Camp David. He came to Egypt, met 
                                                 
23 U.S. Secretary of State 1997–2001. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Madeleine-
Albright 
24 Amr Moussa was the 6th Secretary General of the League of Arab States (2001-2011). 
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with Mubarak and the briefing was pretty negative.  Mubarak 
said to him – even though Mubarak, you remember was angry 
– Mubarak said to him, “Don’t pull the plug. It’s not over. You 
had discussions, they didn’t work, but nobody ended the 
process at Camp David, so don’t you end it.” Mubarak was 
now cheerleading for the American side not to give this thing 
up. And he was right. In fact, that summer, there were a lot of 
intensive discussions that went on, which could have resulted 
in the paper that Clinton put out six months later, but it didn’t.  
So, the alternative to blaming Arafat publicly would have been 
to do it privately. Send your envoy out to Arafat and say, “You 
should have done better here.” But once you blame him 
publicly, what does he take back to his own people?  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Is the United States a fair broker in negotiations? 
  
Kurtzer: No.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Is it a problem? 
  
Kurtzer: It’s only a problem when the U.S.  bends too far.  Aaron Miller, 
in his book, called the United States “Israel’s lawyer”, which 
meant we were bending over too far. When the Palestinians 
say that they were hearing things directly from the Israelis, 
and then they would hear the same things from us, but only 
worse – what were we doing? Why were we pretending to be 
a mediator? In the ‘90s, and I don’t think it exists today, but in 
the ‘90s, you could still say that our relationship with Israel 
was actually an asset, because there was a belief that we 
could use that relationship to help Israel take hard decisions 
by providing a soft landing, safety net, off-the-table benefits, 
more assistance, security, whatever.  In the ‘90s, I think that 
was valid. But it’s only valid if you don’t go overboard with it. 
Because you run the risk of going overboard by feeding Israel, 
without their doing anything. In other words, you feed Israel 
when they take the risk for peace. But if you feed Israel and 
they’re not taking the risk for peace, why is there an incentive 
for any Israeli government to take a risk? If I were an Israeli 
prime minister, why would I do anything, when the Americans 
are going to give me what I want anyway? Somewhere along 
the line, we became  less useful as a mediator. 
  
Cohen-Almagor: Could the United States have put more pressure on Arafat 
and Barak at Camp David?  
  
Kurtzer: Yes, of course.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: And would it be prudent to put more pressure on them? Is it 




Kurtzer: A mediator has to decide whether it has the power and the 
influence and the staying power to do it. In other words, you 
can make threats, but then, are you going to actually carry 
through with the threats? We have the flip side of putting 
pressure, which is incentives, big packages. Look back at 
Kissinger25 in ’75, when we had a crisis with Israel over the 
second Sinai disengagement accord. Rabin ended up 
agreeing to the exact package that he had not agreed with 
four months earlier, because we put an enormous amount of 
pressure and incentives on the table that gave Rabin the 
reason and the ability to say yes. That’s the role the United 
States can play. The question is whether we are ready to put 
a little pressure on? I don’t know the answer to that.  
How many statements have we made since 1967 that we 
think settlements are an impediment to peace? Why would 
anybody listen to us anymore? Yesterday the State 
Department said this. Two weeks ago, they said it. It doesn’t 
mean anything. The one time when we actually took action, 
Israel changed. It was Shamir and loan guarantees, back in 
1991. He wanted loan guarantees for the immigrants. We 
helped secure the freedom of those immigrants, so it was in 
our interest to help them get absorbed. We simply didn’t want 
them settled in the occupied territories. We said that to 
Shamir. He said, “They’re going to settle wherever they want 
to settle.” Then we said, “We’re not going to give you the 
guarantees.” And it helped persuade Shamir to buy into 
Madrid in August, which he had turned down in June.  
  
  
Cohen-Almagor: The Arab Initiative, 2002, what do you think about that? Was 
that something you worked on? 
  
Kurtzer: We heard about the Tom Friedman-Crown Prince Abdullah 
conversations.26 It was also at a time when Cheney was 
visiting the region. It was his first and only trip. But Cheney 
was not interested.27  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Why?  
                                                 
25 Henry Kissinger was President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor (1969-1975) and 
Secretary of State (1973-1977). https://www.biography.com/people/henry-kissinger-
9366016 
26 “Thomas Friedman announces the Saudi Peace Initiative” (February 17, 2002), 
http://www.mideastweb.org/saudipeace_friedman.htm 
27 Richard Bruce Cheney was the 46th Vice President of the United States (2001–2009) in the 
President George W. Bush administration, and Secretary of Defense (1989–1993) in 




Kurtzer: I don’t think he bought the idea at all. He was very 
sympathetic to Sharon’s dilemma with the Intifada. And, most 
important, it was the worst month of the Intifada. It was the 
month just before Pesach [Passover]. Every other day, fifteen 
Israelis were being killed. There was no stomach to think 
about these things. So, there was a moment when Arafat 
wanted to go to the Arab summit and Sharon said, “Sure, you 
can go, but you can’t come back.” And then Sharon said, 
“Actually, if you want to go, I’ll go with you, if I’m invited.” It 
was all seen as not very serious. So, the timing in 2002 was a 
killer, but that doesn’t explain why five years later, in Riyadh, 
when they reaffirmed the Arab Peace Initiative, it also just fell 
dead, without any response.  
I co-authored an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune with 
Rosemary Hollis just before the 2007 Arab summit, where we 
knew they were going to reaffirm the Initiative.28 And the point 
of the op-ed was to say, don’t miss a second opportunity. The 
idea was the U.S. should immediately welcome it, and 
immediately invite the Quartet, the Arab Quartet29 and the 
parties to Washington. Just get them there and start working 
on it.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Nobody picked it up?  
 
Kurtzer: No.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Okay. Gaza. Was it the right thing to evacuate Gaza? For the 
Israelis? 
  
Kurtzer: As a political move, it was extraordinary. As a political move 
by the man who put the settlers in Gaza in the first place, it’s 
even more extraordinary. Three things I would say in answer 
to your question. Number one, I actually think Sharon was 
ready to move beyond Gaza, had it succeeded. Number two, I 
think Arafat, when it first came out, in December of 2003 and 
later, made a fundamental strategic error by not pocketing it 
and doing something. And number three, Sharon made a 
tactical mistake by keeping it unilateral until near the very end, 
when he then opened up the idea that we have to coordinate. 
It’s not that he was responsible for what happened afterwards, 
but the Palestinians were given an easy excuse. “You know, 
we don’t even know where the key to the men’s room is.” 
                                                 
28  Daniel Kurtzer and Rosemary Hollis, “An Arab Initiative That Can Work”, International 
Herald Tribune, March 21, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/opinion/21iht-
edhollis.4978404.html?_r=0 
29 Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. 
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Israel walked out of the place after occupying it for 38 years.  I 
think it was a very bad tactical mistake. I know that there were 
Israeli officials we were dealing with at the time who agreed 
that it was a tactical mistake, but they had their instructions, 
and the instructions were not to negotiate the evacuation with 
the Palestinians.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: So, to do it was right, but the way of doing it was wrong? 
That’s what you think? 
  
Kurtzer: Yes. And number four would be not preparing the ground for 
the settlers who were evacuated. A lot of them didn’t want the 
ground prepared. They didn’t want to move into readymade 
apartments.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: And allowing Hamas to participate in the elections in 2006 
was a good idea?  
  
Kurtzer: I was already out of government at that point. I had left right 
after the disengagement. U.S. thinking at the time was that 
anybody who participates has to meet certain criteria. In other 
words, we didn’t talk about Hamas or not Hamas. But 
everybody has to commit to peace and no violence. Which, 
obviously, would either rule out Hamas, or would reflect a 
change in Hamas. Three months later, before the turnover, I 
was visiting Israel and it was clear that U.S. policy had 
changed, that we were encouraging the election and not 
establishing preconditions. I think a lot of that had to do with a 
very bad assessment on the part of both U.S. and Israeli 
intelligence that the PLO was going to win the election. I saw 
a well-known Palestinian pollster30 during that trip and asked  
“What’s going to happen?” And he said, “Hamas is going to do 
very well.” He maintained, “I don’t know what the numbers 
are, but they’re going to do very, very well.”  It was not that 
they were so popular; it was that the PLO was so unpopular 
and corrupt. Condi Rice wrote in her book that she woke up 
on election day in Palestine and was “shocked” that the 
Hamas had won the election.31 I wasn’t shocked. I was sitting 
here, in Princeton, and I wasn’t shocked.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: You think it was a mistake to allow them to run? 
  
Kurtzer: Of course. If, if the Palestinian Authority was an advanced 
democracy, then years before, we would have argued that 
                                                 
30 Khalil Shikaki, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/192 
31 Condoleezza Rice served as the United States' National Security Adviser (2001-2005), and 
as U.S. Secretary of State (2005-2009). She is the author of No Higher Honor (NY, 2011).  
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everybody should be allowed to participate.  We’re talking 
about stability. We’re talking about a people, a non-sovereign, 
occupied people. So, there have to be measures to limit 
problems. Hamas is a problem.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: How do you deal with that?  
  
Kurtzer: Well, I thought the idea was to establish fair conditions. We 
used to have them in the United States during the period of 
the Soviet Union, that you had to sign, when you registered to 
vote, that you were not a member of the Communist Party. 
But it’s an acceptable part of democracy to have certain 
conditions. Hamas candidates should have been expected to 
declare that they accepted the agreements into which the PLO 
had entered. Which means they would have accepted Oslo, 
basically.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: How do you deal today with Hamas? First of all, Israel wants 
security. The Israelis are saying, if we’re going to have peace 
without security, we’d rather have security without peace. How 
do you deal with this issue? 
  
Kurtzer: One way is to consider a long term hudna.32 The argument 
would be that they’re not ready for peace with Israel. Israel is 
not ready for peace with them. They want to destroy each 
other, but they both have an interest not to fight all the time, 
so they work out red lines, for example, Hamas won’t fire 
rockets, Israel will lift the siege a little bit. Maybe they will be 
allowed to build a port under international supervision. Such 
agreements don’t require one side to recognize the other.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Can that be accepted by Hamas?  
  
Kurtzer: I think Hamas has basically accepted it since 2007. The red 
lines have been crossed sometimes. They’ve been blurred. If 
there’s a possibility of a red line agreement working, or an 
informal hudna working, it has to be more clearly understood 
by the two sides. You may need a third party. Maybe not the 
United States, but Egypt or Qatar or somebody to really get a 
clear understanding that’s not going to be committed to paper. 
That’s one possibility.  
  
Cohen-Almagor: Does the United States speak to Hamas? 
  
Kurtzer: No. That’s why I’m saying that it won’t be the United States 
that will do that. The second possibility is to let Hamas and 
Fatah reconcile. Don’t stand in their way, which we and Israel 
                                                 
32 Truce or armistice. 
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both do. We’ve made clear we don’t want that to happen. Let 
them reconcile. And instead of requiring Hamas to accept the 
international conditions of recognizing Israel and renouncing 
terrorism, impose those conditions on the government that 
follows. In other words, tell them that we will not deal with a 
Palestinian Authority which has abandoned recognition of 
Israel, renunciation of terrorism and so forth. So that any 
Hamas person who joins that government will be working 
according to those conditions.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: Hamas is in the government, but it’s a technical government, a 
specialist government. Without adhering to the guidelines, still, 
Hamas is there. That’s the way they play this issue. 
  
Kurtzer:  I would deal with Hamas through a back door. Have them get 
their toes wet a little bit. Have them take some responsibility 




Back door between Israel and the Hamas? 
  
Kurtzer: No, a back door to the three conditions.   
  
Cohen-Almagor: What are the three conditions? 
  
Kurtzer: Recognizing Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of terrorism 
and accepting agreements that have already been entered 
into, meaning Oslo. The U.S. position is that until Hamas does 
those things, we won’t deal with Hamas. Hamas is not going 
to do those things first. But, if you walk them through a back 
door, where they’re entering into a government that does 
agree with those principles, and you deal with that 
government –   you’ve gotten them “a little bit pregnant”.   
 
Conclusion  
Oslo was a breakthrough. For the first time, Israelis and official 
representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization sat with each other to 
talk peace. Until then, Israel refused to recognize the PLO. Israeli leaders 
invented Palestinian representatives that were mere strawmen, and strawmen 
are just that, strawmen. They did not represent the Palestinians. They served 
Israeli interests, and consequently, were unable to deliver. For Kurtzer, this 
was the single most important achievement of Oslo. Israel and the PLO 
negotiated directly. 
Oslo, however, was not detailed enough. Major issues were ignored, 
which led to the failure of the implementation of the agreement. 
Simultaneously, Kurtzer and his colleagues were drafting a more 
comprehensive text that included contentious issue such as Jerusalem, the 
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settlements, jurisdiction and final status. Kurtzer had in mind a two-state 
solution, whereas Rabin had in mind Palestinian autonomy, a framework that 
would not have satisfied the Palestinians. Oslo was based on the 1978 
Camp David Accords and there, the negotiations revolved around Palestinian 
autonomy. 
An interesting question is why the Washington delegation acted in 
accordance with a very different set of instructions than those followed in 
Oslo, and why the Oslo delegation had more freedom in the negotiations 
than the Washington delegation. The answer has to do with the buildup of 
the delegations and with the American presence only in Washington. While 
Rabin had closely monitored Washington, he came to know Oslo later in the 
game. Oslo was orchestrated first by Beilin, then by Peres and only later by 
Rabin. Beilin and Peres were willing to make concessions and to dictate an 
agenda that had a better chance to bear fruit. Rabin approved that agenda 
ex post factum. And secondly, as Kurtzer says, Washington scared Rabin, 
because the Americans were pushing him on substance and Rabin was 
holding back.   
According to Kurtzer, Rabin’s conception of Oslo was that it would 
feed into the Washington talks. This did not happen, arguably because Rabin 
wanted to progress slowly with the peace talks, and with peace-building. He 
wanted to see the fruits of Oslo before he made his next move. For Rabin, 
the security issue was essential; because he did not trust Arafat, caution was 
the name of the game. In a recent interview, Joel Singer said: “Every draft 
was seen and approved by him [Rabin] and I heard from him not once, not 
twice, not three times: ‘It’s all about security. I don't care about any other 
aspect of the Oslo agreement’, he said. ‘It’s all about security. If there is 
security, the agreement will succeed. If there is no security and it’s otherwise 
perfect, the agreement will fail’.”33 The Oslo process failed not only because 
of waves of Palestinian terrorism that had swept Israel. At the same time, 
undoubtedly lack of security, including Rabin’s personal security, played a 
major part in the failing Oslo saga. 
Kurtzer thinks the absence of the United States served Oslo well. The 
Norwegians were good facilitators and they were well aware of their 
limitations. They were careful not to assume responsibilities that they would 
not be able to carry. The Norwegians could not press either side, and they 
knew it. They were unable to mediate between the two parties. 
United States can mediate between the two sides. President Carter 
mediated successfully between Israel and Egypt and, as a result, the two 
countries signed a peace treaty. Camp David 2000, however, greatly differed 
from Camp David 1978, and Kurtzer voices his frustration. Unlike 1978, in 
2000 there was no American paper to lead the negotiations, nor was there 
even an agreed concept.34 The Americans were ill-prepared for the summit. 
Arafat did not want to come to Camp David, and the gaps between Israel and 
the PLO were too wide to be bridged. Interestingly, Kurtzer does not think the 
U.S. needs to be a fair broker, so long as it does not bend too far. 
                                                 
33 R. Cohen-Almagor, “The Oslo Peace Process: Interview with Joel Singer”. 
34 William Quandt, Peace Process (Berkeley, 2005).  
 
 24 
There are two important lessons for the future. First, the Americans 
should base negotiations on a paper requiring concessions from both sides, 
as was the case in the successful 1978 summit between Israel and Egypt. 
Without such a paper, there is no anchor on which to base the negotiations.35 
In a follow-up to the interview,36 Kurtzer explains that a third-party mediator 
has choices to make about how much, whether and when to intervene in 
bilateral negotiations. Often, the third party will develop a paper that 
summarizes positions, lays out differences and suggests bridging positions. 
Alternatively, the third party can draft entire sections of an agreement and 
present them to the parties. In either case, the third party needs to do 
substantial work in advance, and must avoid putting forth a paper (a) where 
neither side is familiar with its concepts, or (b) that has been 
shared/coordinated with only one side. In Camp David 2000, Kurtzer thinks 
that the U.S. had not discussed the paper in advance in much detail, and then 
consulted only Israel in crafting what became the paper it put forward.  The 
United States should have consulted with both sides in advance, and should 
have tried out formulas first, before committing them to a U.S. paper. Only 
then should the United States have shared the paper with both parties. 
Negotiating in good faith is a key for successful negotiations.  
Second, there is a need to involve more Arab countries in the peace 
process. The Palestinians need them, especially in order to reach a viable 
agreement regarding the questions of Jerusalem, the Haram al-Sharif (the 
Temple Mount), and the refugee problem. The Israelis need them, as well, to 
support the process and resolve obstacles. Arab countries have important 
assets and abilities to move things in the right direction. To begin with, Egypt 
and Jordan, the two countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel and 
border on the conflict zones, should be involved. Saudi Arabia is also a 
possible partner at this stage, if its leaders are willing to play a constructive 
role, not only because of their personal interests vis-à-vis Iran, but because of 
their potential genuine will to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close. Of 
course, such a dramatic change will have a major positive impact on the 
Middle East and beyond, and will serve nations that support peace and fight 
terror. 
                                                 
35 Interview with Aharon Barak (July 8, 2018); Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (London, 1982): 
368-371; Stuart E. Eizenstat, President Carter: The White House Years (NY, 2018). 
36 Email on October 8, 2018. 
